Uncovering the Gender Participation Gap in Crime by Campaniello, N & Gavrilova, E
Uncovering the Gender Participation Gap in Crime
Nadia Campaniello∗ Evelina Gavrilova†
January 11, 2017
∗Corresponding author, University of Essex and IZA, ncampa@essex.ac.uk, Wivenhoe Park, CO4 3SQ
Colchester, Uk
†NHH Norwegian School of Economics, evelina.gavrilova@nhh.no, Norwegian School of Economics,
Helleveien 30, 5045 Bergen, NO
1
Abstract
Research on the gender variation in the crime market, a peculiar labor market for
illegal activities, is limited, although the issue is relevant per se and for its policy impli-
cations. We document a gender gap in criminal activities, based on property and white
collar crimes, using data from the U.S. National Incident Based Reporting System. We
show that there is a gender participation gap where around 30 percent of the crimes are
committed by females. In order to explain, at least in part, the gender participation
gap we investigate whether there are differences in incentives to be involved in criminal
activities and in responsiveness to these incentives across gender. In particular we focus
on criminal earnings and probability of arrest. We show that on average females earn 18
percent less than males while they face the same likelihood of arrest. We find that females
are more responsive to changes in the expected probability of arrest, while males respond
more to changes in the expected illegal earnings. The fact that females behave differently
than males has implications for the heterogeneity in response to crime control policies. In
addition, using a Blinder-Oaxaca type decomposition technique, we find that differences
in incentives explain about 12 percent of the gender crime gap, while differences in re-
sponsiveness explain about 55 percent of the gap.
Keywords: Gender Gap in Crime, Crime Incentives, Synthetic panel
JEL Classification: J16, K42
1 Introduction
Most research in the economics of crime has focused on male perpetrators (Levitt & Miles,
2007; Freeman, 1999) with the implicit assumptions that female crime is so little that it is
of no consequences or that policy implications have external validity across genders. Indeed,
the number of women committing crime worldwide is much lower than that of men, but in
recent time this gender gap is shrinking. In Figure 1 we show that the trend in the percentage
of women incarcerated has increased over the period 1930-2009 in the United States. The
percentage of women incarcerated in 1930 was just 4.5%, increased steadily over the last 80
years, and reached 12% in 2009 1. The underlying participation in crime is even higher and
increasing as well, as we show in Figure 22. The increasing trend on both figures mimics
the decrease in the gender gap in the labor market. While there is an extensive literature
on the gender gap in the legal labor market, there is no economic research that looks at the
gender gap in crime. Since the number of females committing crimes is on the rise, it is
essential to understand how they differ from males in their criminal decision making in terms
1The only exception is the post-Second World War drop that followed a peak in 1945 driven by the under
representation of males due to wartime service.
2To reconcile the participation rate of females in crime to incarceration statistics see Table A.1.
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of opportunities, deterrents and violence. In this article we focus on property crimes (including
white collar crimes, a quite neglected and understudied typology of crimes in the literature)
because they are found to be the most responsive to incentives that, in turn, determine the
expected costs and benefits of committing crimes. It stands to reason that the gender gap in
the decision to engage in illegal activities might be driven on one side by biological factors and
sociocultural factors like the role of women in the household, among others. On the other side,
it might be driven by factors captured by the model of Becker (1968), such as opportunities
in the legal labor market, economic returns to crime, deterrence and incapacitation. In our
paper we focus on the latter factors in the form of incentives (and responsiveness to incentives)
that alter the costs of engaging in criminal activities, thus potentially shaping the gender gap
in crime.
Using the U.S. National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) matched with pop-
ulation statistics for the period 1995 - 2011, we find that females earn 13 percent less than
males and face a higher likelihood of being arrested than men (+4.6 percent), we also find
that shoplifting is a special crime with a high participation of females. When we remove it, we
find that the earnings gap increases to 18 percent but the arrest gap disappears. In order to
determine how illegal earnings and probability of arrest influence the participation decision,
we develop a novel empirical strategy. We use a two-stage model, where in the first stage
we predict earnings and arrest with their past values, in order to identify the expectations of
criminals. Then we use these predicted values to see how female and male crime rates respond
to the expectations of earnings and arrest. We find that males have a higher elasticity of illegal
earnings of 37 percent compared to 25 percent for females. On the other hand, females are
more responsive to changes in the arrest probability with an elasticity of -15 percent compared
to males at -10 percent. By exploiting a partial Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition we find that if
females were more “manly” with respect to incentives and responsiveness to them this would
reduce the participation gap by 67 percent.
Crucially, our elasticities with respect to the probability of arrest could be compared to
previous literature. In a recent review of research, Chalfin & McCrary (2017) show that
estimated elasticities with respect to an increase in the police manpower are in the range of
-10 to -20 percent. Our estimates fall well within this range and are significant at conventional
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levels. Given that male and female elasticities differ significantly, we show that there would
be additional heterogeneity in the response of criminals to policies that increase the likelihood
of arrest. Likely, females would decrease their participation more than males.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies with US data with estimated elasticities
with respect to illegal earnings to which we can compare our estimates. Our elasticities are
roughly in the range 25-40 percent as estimated by Draca et al. (2015) on UK data.
Our research is of interest to policy makers that want to decrease crime. We provide
evidence for the heterogeneity in response between genders to policies that alter the incen-
tives to engage in crime. More specifically, if the policy maker wants to discourage males
to participate in crime, this would be most effective with policies that decrease the value of
potential earnings. Examples for such policies are black market regulation, where pawn shops
could be placed under additional surveillance or additional security for higher value items. If
the policy maker wants to discourage female crime, then policies that alter the likelihood of
detection and arrest are more effective. Such policies include increases in the police manpower
and deployment strategies.
We contribute to several strands in the literature. Most prominently, in the Handbook of
Labour Economics, Freeman (1999) acknowledges the gap in studies about the gender varia-
tion in crime and underlines that there are no studies by economists that analyze the large
difference in the participation of males and females looking at incentives. Since then there
has been scant response to this apparent gap and we are the first to fully investigate this
research question. Nevertheless there is a number of recent (with the exception of Bartel
(1979)) papers by economists that look at female criminals. The earliest economic study on
female criminals, Bartel (1979), investigates the determinants of female participation in crime
through an Ehrlich type model of time division. The author finds that probabilities of con-
viction and arrest have a deterrent effect on females in some property crimes. Our results are
in line with her findings.
Recently, Corman et al. (2014) find that the 1996 welfare reform in the U.S., aimed at in-
centivizing female work, led to a decrease in female arrests for serious property crimes by
4.4 − 4.9%. In our paper we control for employment opportunities and wage that represent
the opportunity costs of being involved in criminal activities.
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Cano-Urbina et al. (2016) find that one more year of school for females reduces, on average,
property and violent crimes by 50%, while they do not find any effect on white collar crime.
They argue that the effect of education on crime for females is probably due to changes in
marital opportunities rather than in labor market opportunities.
Gavrilova (2013) finds that females are likely discriminated against in the market for criminal
partnerships, which might be one of the drivers for their lower participation.
Finally, a recent paper by Miller & Segal (2014) studies the relationship between females
and crime looking at victimization. The authors find that the gender composition within the
police force influences female reporting and victimization rate for violent crimes.
From a historical perspective, in the 70s concurrently with the women emancipation move-
ments, there have been concerns about an increase in the female participation in crime3. In
line with the zeitgeist, Simon (1976) discusses the trends in female criminal behavior. Using
UCR data, she notes that female crime rates have increased two times from 1932 to 1972,
measured by share of females arrested.
By focusing our analysis on the illegal earnings of criminals we are contributing to the
understanding of “the most understudied element of crime” (Draca & Machin, 2015). Recent
literature has only attempted to approximate the illegal earnings of criminals (with the notable
exception of Draca et al. (2015)), while we have more precise information on the value of the
property stolen.
Finally, we provide evidence on white collar crimes. While most economic studies con-
centrate on property or violent crimes, as reported in the FBI annual reports, we exploit the
detail provided by NIBRS and investigate white collar offenses.
2 Data
For our analysis we use the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). This dataset
contains records on the universe of crime incidents for a given year for a given law-enforcement
agency in the United States. The data are not representative for the United States as a whole,
as many agencies do not submit reports and the expansion of data collection is on-going. A
3See for e.g. Steffensmeier & Allan (1996) for a recent summary of trends in the gender gap in crime, as
seen from the perspective of sociology.
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typical observation is a coded report about a criminal incident. It contains the number
of perpetrators, their demographic characteristics and crime codes, a victim report on how
much was stolen and an arrest report, if an arrest has been effectuated. Criminal earnings
are recorded no matter whether there was an arrest.
As already mentioned, we limit our analysis to property crimes (including white collar
crimes). We do this for three reasons. First, property crimes respond more to incentives than
other typologies of crimes (for example violent crimes are more likely to be driven by psycho-
logical problems). Second, property crimes are more common than other crimes. The violent
crime rate over the period 2011 is 387.1 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, while the property
crime rate is 2,905.4 crimes. Third, in property crimes we can observe a measure of illegal
earnings.
We use the following Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) offense codes: 231 Pocket-picking, 232
Purse-snatching, 233 Shop lifting, 234 Theft from Building, 235 Theft from Coin-Operated-
Machine, 236 Theft from or of Motor Vehicle, 237 Parts, 238 All other larceny, 240 Motor
Vehicle Theft, 220 Burglary, 120 Robbery, 280 Stolen Property Offenses, 261 Swindle, 262
Credit Card ATM Fraud, 263 Impersonation, 264 Welfare Fraud, 265 Wire Fraud, 250 Coun-
terfeiting/Forgery, 270 Embezzlement, 210 Extortion/Blackmail, 510 Bribery4.
Once we select these crime incidents we have 24 million observations on criminals over the
period 1995 to 2011. A given incident can consist of several perpetrators, and we assume that
if one of them was not observed well, then also the other ones are observed with measurement
error. Therefore, to alleviate these measurement issues we drop in total 32 percent of the data.
5 We then select individuals between 15-44 years of age, of black or white race. This selection
is guided by the availability of control variables, as we want to approximate the opportunity
cost of crime in the best way we can. Therefore, we keep 40 percent of the original sample.
Ideally, to understand the participation decision we would estimate a discrete choice model
of crime. However, we have information only on crimes committed, not on the other avail-
able choices. Therefore, we define “pseudo-individuals” and construct a synthetic panel (see
4We sum over 261 Swindle, 262 Credit Card ATM Fraud, 263 Impersonation, 264 Welfare Fraud, 265 Wire
Fraud and we call them “Fraud” and we sum over 210 Extortion/Blackmail and 510 Bribery and we call them
“Bribery and Extorsion”
5See Table A.2 for a tabulation of the missing gender variable by crime.
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Deaton, 1985). We aggregate crimes within “cohorts” and divide by the corresponding pop-
ulation, thus getting a measure of crime rates and variation in the participation decision.
Cohorts share similar characteristics such that they would face similar incentives to commit
crimes, having similar expectations over criminal proceeds and perceived likelihood of arrest.
They are defined based on: interval of age (15-24, 25-34 and 35-446), race (black and white),
gender (male, female), and county (on average there are 2590 counties per year). The panel
spans over a period of 16 years.
The resulting unbalanced panel is treated as pseudo-individuals that can be tracked over
time. For some cohorts, mainly those with few observations, we sometimes get estimated
probabilities of arrest that are 0 or 1. Since these are the product of cohorts of small size
rather than their true expected values, we aggregate them sequentially over age group and
then race, year, county, and finally typology of crime until we get values that are away from
0 or 1. As for illegal earnings in the main regressions we discard those observations where
the expected illegal earnings are equal to 0, while in the robustness checks we compute them
using the same strategy that we adopted for probability of arrest.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics. Across cohorts there are two times less females
than males. They have both a smaller likelihood of arrest and less earnings than males.
Turning first to the participation decision, in Figure 2 we plot the ratio of the number
of females to males. We show that this ratio is always below 0.5, meaning that across the
years there are at least 2 men for every woman criminal. We observe that the participation
of females is increasing, in line with the incarceration numbers shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 2 we present the ratio of illegal earnings of females to males. The ratio is always
below one corresponding to the fact that over the sample years female earn less than males on
average. This ratio is not stable across the years, which is all the more reason to concentrate
on within year variation later in the empirical specification. Behind this average there might
be other significant heterogeneity hidden, so we explore the density of the obtained logged
illegal earnings in the top panels in Figure 3. We show that the illegal earnings of females are
bimodal. In the right panel we drop shoplifting and show that the illegal earnings of males
6Data on the general population at county level are just available until the age of 44 and we know that 75
percent of the crimes are committed by perpetrators from the selected age groups.
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and females become more similar.
When we look at the arrest ratio in Figure 2 we observe that females are more likely to be
arrested than males. When we look at the density of the log of the arrest rate Figure 3, we
observe that again shoplifting is biasing the distribution of observed female criminals when
we compare the two figure in the bottom panels. It seems that shoplifting is observed often
when there is an arrest, which translates into many zeros in the log of probability of arrest.
Once we drop shoplifting, the distributions of males and females are more similar.
In Figure 4 we show how participation varies with respect to illegal earnings and arrest for
different crime types. The size of the circle is proportional to the fraction of females in each
crime and it is noticeable that females participate most in shoplifting. In addition, when we
show the linear fit between gender participation gap and illegal earnings (in log, top panel),
and gender participation gap and arrest (in log, bottom panel) we observe that shoplifting
significantly biases the relationship (in the left part of the panel we plot all property crimes,
in the right one we exclude shoplifting). Since shoplifting represents a clear outlier, in our
main results we get rid of it and we include it in the robustness checks.
Finally, in Table 1 we present the control variables. We take data on population (by age, gen-
der, race, year, and county) from the Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research
(WONDER). Data on average wages and employment rates (by age, gender, race, decade, and
state) are taken from the CENSUS Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA).
3 Model of Crime
3.1 Theory
In this section we present a model of crime participation, based on Becker (1968). An indi-
vidual compares the expected utility of committing a crime with the expected utility of not
committing a crime. The expected benefits of committing a crime are the illegal earnings while
the expected costs are the probability of arrest and the sanction length, and the opportunity
costs of being engaged in the legal labor market (wage, employment rate).
In a generalized version, an individual decides to be involved in a criminal activity if a
function of costs and benefits is larger than an individual idiosyncratic error Υg, which mea-
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sures any unobserved determinants of crime (sociocultural reasons, family reasons, biological
and genetic factors, etc.) for gender g = m, f :
fg(Ŷ g, P̂ g, ̂WAGES
g
, ̂EMPLOYMENT
g
, ̂SANCTION
g
) > Υg , (1)
where ĥats indicate expectations. So, for example, Ŷ g are expected economic returns to
crime (criminal earnings) and P̂ g is the expected probability of arrest.
In order to derive an estimable equation we do the following steps. First we aggregate the
equation across individuals, deriving crime rates. Second, since the function f() is unknown,
we log-linearize f() with respect to all the incentives variables (small letters for logs):
crimerateg = βg1 ŷ
g + βg2 p̂
g + βg3ŵages
g
+ βg4
̂employment
g
+ βg5 ̂sanction
g
+ εg (2)
The equation shows that the gender crime gap could be due to differences in incentives as
well as differences in the way criminals of different genders respond to such incentives.
3.2 Estimation
In this section we present our empirical methodology. First, we map out the differences
between the two genders in terms of illegal earnings and arrest - two of the main incentives
in the crime participation decision. Second, we show how sensitive this participation decision
is to changes in incentives of probability of arrest and illegal earnings.
3.2.1 Incentives
In Figure 2 we documented significant differences between males and females in terms of illegal
earnings, arrest and participation. To show how these differences vary with other factors that
are also correlated with gender we estimate the following specification:
incentiveigt = β1(g = f)igt +X
′
igtγ + εigt (3)
where incentiveit is either the log arrest rate or the log transformed value of property
9
stolen of criminals in cohort i and year t and 1(g = f) is an indicator function equal to one
when the gender is female. X is a vector containing personal-cohort traits like race, age,
average wage and unemployment rate. A β = 0 would imply that for the baseline that there
is no gender gap in any of these measures.
Including offense fixed effects allows us to determine how much of the unconditional gap is
due to differences between offenses. For example, we expect that a criminal would earn more
in auto theft crimes than in shoplifting and if males specialize in the former, while females
specialize in the latter, this would earn a high unconditional gap. In order to control for
county specific heterogeneity such as police presence in any given year, in some specifications
the error term includes county-year fixed effects. Furthermore in the last specifications the
error term also includes state-offense fixed effects to control for differences in sanctions across
different states. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the county level, in order to account
for correlation of residuals over time within county.
3.2.2 Responsiveness to Incentives
Once we map the differences between the two genders in criminal earnings and arrest proba-
bilities we turn to the participation decision. Starting from Equation 2 we obtain
crimerategit = β
g
1 ŷ
g
it + β
g
2 p̂
g
it +X
g′
it δ
g + εgit, for g = m, f, (4)
where crimerate is the log crime rate defined as the number of crimes committed in a
given year by people within a cohort, defined by age group, race, and county, divided by
the general population in the same cohort. ŷ is the expected log of illegal earnings, p̂ is
the expected log probability of being apprehended. X is a vector containing personal traits
(wage and salary income, employment rate, race, age groups). As for Equation 3 in some
specifications the error term includes county-year fixed effects, in order to control for county
specific heterogeneity such as police presence in any given year. In the last specifications the
error term includes state-offense fixed effects to control for differences in criminal sanctions
across different states. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the county level. Note that
we estimate this equation separately for males and females.
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Using the contemporaneous values ŷi,t and p̂i,t we face two potential issues i) reverse
causality due to the potential simultaneity between the incentives and the decision to commit
a crime (for example, crime congestion might lower the likelihood of apprehension) and ii) due
to the yearly aggregation criminals’ expectations might be based on future crimes, introducing
additional measurement error.
One solution would be to use the lagged values of the incentives, which implicitly assumes
that the proper expectations of criminals are adaptive, being based on what happened in
the previous year. Since it might be the case that zi,t−1 = (yi,t−1, pi,t−1) are not the true
criminals’ expectations, we face potential measurement error. Rather than relying on such an
assumption, we model the expectations for both illegal earnings and probability of arrest and
test whether they are adaptive (α=1):
ẑgit = α
gzgi,t−1 +X
′
itρ
g + ξgit, for g = m, f. (5)
In modeling the expectations we use a two step procedure, where in the first stage we
obtain p̂ and ŷ and in the second step these measures are plugged into equation 4. In other
words, these equations are similar to a first stage in a 2SLS setup where yt−1 and pt−1 are
used as instruments for yt and pt.
3.3 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
In order to gauge the importance of the incentives and their elasticities in determining the
gender crime gap we use a partial Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (limited to p and y). The
decomposition measures the fraction of the gender crime gap that arises because females and
males, on average: i) face different incentives and ii) respond differently to incentives.
The counterfactual equation for women where we replaced their incentives (their “endow-
ment’) with those from male equation is:
̂crimerate
CF,Xs
fit = ̂crimeratefit + (zmict − zfit)β̂fz (6)
The counterfactual equation for women where we replace their coefficients on incentives
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with those from the male equation is:
̂crimerate
CF,βs
fit = ̂crimeratefit + (β̂mz − β̂fz )(zfit − zf ). (7)
Subtracting the minimum value zf normalizes the intercept and rotates the counterfactual
around its minimum value (rather than around z = 0).
It can be shown the fraction of the crime gap that can be explained by differences in
incentives and elasticities is
̂crimerate
CF,βs
fit − ̂crimeratefit
̂crimeratemit − ̂crimeratefit
+
̂crimerate
CF,Xs
fit − ̂crimeratefit
̂crimeratemit − ̂crimeratefit
(8)
4 Results
4.1 Differences in incentives
In Table 2 we present results for the illegal earnings gap. As we explain in Section 2, shoplifting
is a special crime, therefore we exclude it from the first four columns and we include it in the
last column as a robustness check. In column 1 we show that conditional on demographic
characteristics and variables that affect the opportunity cost of crime, females have 18 percent
less criminal earnings. In the next three columns we add progressively more fixed effects, yet
the gap is stable around 18 percent. Our preferred specification is that of column 4 with
all the controls and the fixed effects. By adding these fixed effects we want to account for
jurisdiction specific policing responses, for the sanction for a specific crime in each State, as
well as availability of criminal targets related to the business cycle. In column 5 we select
a subsample of daylight crimes committed between 8 AM and 7 PM. We do this robustness
check in order to alleviate concerns on reporting bias: it might be the case that if the female
perpetrators were not well observed they would be reported as male. In column 5 we observe
that the gap is still negative and larger in magnitude. Females earn 22 percent less than males
in daylight crimes. This implies that, if anything, reporting bias would drive the gender gap
towards 0.
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As a robustness check we include shoplifting in the sample in column 6. We find that
the gap diminishes to 13 percent meaning that the earnings gap in shoplifting is in favor of
females and is significant enough to attenuate estimates on the earnings gap in all crimes.
In Table 3 we present the results for the arrest gap. In the first column the arrest gap is
negative, but it turns insignificant as we control for more heterogeneity in different counties
and years and we control for the typology of offense they commit and the interaction between
offense and State fixed effects. As before, our preferred in specification is that in column 4.
The arrest gap remains insignificant also in daylight crimes, suggesting that the result is not
driven by reporting bias. In the last column we show that shoplifting drives the estimates on
the average gap in arrest rates, which now flips to 4.6 percentage points, such that females
face a higher likelihood of arrest. In line with what we already shown the reason is that, in
the grand majority of cases, shoplifting (the most committed crime by females) is reported
when the criminal gets arrested thus upward biasing the coefficient on arrest for females.
Therefore, conditional on crime participation we find that females earn 13 to 18 percent
less than males and face the same likelihood of being arrested (when we do not include
shoplifting).
4.2 Differences in Responsiveness
Table 4 shows our estimates for the first stage and reduced form using alternative specifications
with and without county fixed effects and their interaction with year fixed effects, and with
and without state fixed effects and their interaction with typology of offense fixed effects. The
lag of the (log) probability of arrest and the lag of (log) illegal earnings are good predictors
of, respectively, the probability of arrest and illegal earnings. The F-statistics is, in all the
specifications, well above conventional levels. Since the αs in both the equations are lower than
1, it follows that expectations are not adaptive meaning that we should take the instrumental
variable as our preferred specification. In line with the first stage results, the reduced form
cannot be interpret as the true elasticities but it is reassuring that the coefficients have the
right sign. An increase in the illegal earnings is associated with an increase in the crime rate
and an increase in the probability of arrest are associated with a decrease in the crime rates.
In Table 5 we present the 2SLS estimates on the gender-specific response elasticities. In
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each additional column we control for more sources of heterogeneity such as police presence,
sentence length and business cycle effects by adding fixed effects and their interactions. We
show in the odd columns with the header “Male” that a 100 percent increase in the expected
illegal earnings would lead to a 8 to 37 percent higher participation of males in crime. Similarly,
the elasticity of expected criminal earnings for females is between from 0 to 32 percent, with
a final coefficient of 25 percent in our preferred specification in the last column. On average,
we observe that females have always a significantly lower elasticity of illegal earnings than
males.
With respect to the probability of arrest, we find that the elasticity of females is between
-10 and -22 percent, while that of males is between -10 and -16 percent. In our preferred
specification (columns 7 and 8, the male coefficient is -10 percent and the female one is -15
percent). Therefore, females respond significantly stronger to an increase in the probability
of apprehension than males do.
With respect to the control variables, we find that being black is associated with an
increase in the crime rate. Offenders aged from 15-24 contribute more to the crime rate
than offenders aged 25-34 compared to the excluded category 35-44. The crime rate is also
associated with the average wage and employment rate in all specifications, even though the
coefficients change in the different specifications that we use. These results seem to be highly
dependent on the inclusion of the fixed effects. When we use the fixed effects the employment
rate is negatively associated, as expected, with the crime rates, while average wage is positively
associated with crime rates (it might be explained thinking that income reflects the presence
of individuals who provide good targets for criminals involved in property crimes). To sum up,
when modeling the expectations we find that both males and females respond to incentives.
Females are more responsive to fluctuations in the probability of arrest, while males are more
responsive to the changes in illegal earnings.
In the appendix, in Table A.3, we show OLS estimates. We find that the estimates of the
elasticities are smaller and sometimes fail to be significant. These results are consistent with
the measurement error and the endogeneity issues outlined before.
Robustness Checks. In Table 6 we perform some robustness checks to be sure that our
results do not depend on the particular specification we used. First of all, instead of discarding
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data with missing values for illegal earnings, we assign them the average of illegal earnings
that we compute aggregating over age group and then race, year, county, and finally typology
of crime until we get values that are different from 0. The differences between males and
females remain the same, though the elasticities are smaller for illegal earnings and larger for
arrest.
To be sure that our results are not biased by the different dimension of the counties, we
weight the estimates by the population in the county. Estimates remain similar. When we add
shoplifting, we find that the elasticities are very similar to those of our main specification for
earnings but lower in magnitude for arrest. Finally when using the number of crimes instead
of the crime rates as our dependent variable, our estimates are in line with our main results
even though the elasticities on illegal earnings are larger in magnitude.
4.3 Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Using Equation 8 the fact that women respond more to the arrest probabilities and less to
the monetary incentives explains 55 percent of the gap. Another 12 percent is due to the
differences in incentives men and women face. The counterfactual CDFs of female crime if
they responded to the incentives like men are shown in Figure 6, while Figure 5 shows what
would happen if they faced the same incentives.
5 Conclusion
In this article we reveal that gender gaps are not only a feature of the labor market and we
contribute to the economic literature on crime. We find that females are less likely to engage
in crime (they represent 30 percent of the total property crimes in the United States). To
identify the possible motives for the gender gap in crime participation we look at possible
differences in incentives to engage in criminal activities across gender (we focus on illegal
earnings and probability of arrest) and we investigate whether males and females respond
differently to perceived incentives to commit crimes. We find that female criminals earn 18
percent less than male criminals while they face the same likelihood of arrest. Such difference
in incentives explains 12 percent of the gender gap in crime. We find that the decision of both
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males and females to engage in criminal activities depends on the expected earnings and on
the probability of being arrested. Men are significantly more responsive than women to the
expected monetary incentives, while women show a higher disutility to get arrested (probably
for some sociocultural factors like their role in the households, child-rearing, social norms,
etc.). Such differences in incentives and in the way the two genders respond to incentives
explains 55 percent of the male-female participation gap in crime.
This paper has focused on trying to explain the gender participation gap in crime while has
not tackled the issue of the gender convergence over time that we leave for future investigation.
Finally, we leave the resolution of the participation gap that we could not explain for future
research.
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Figure 1: Fraction of Women Incarcerated and in the Labour Force in the U.S
Notes: On the left axis we plot the fraction of females incarcerated while on the right axis we plot the
fraction of women in the labour force in the US over the period 1930-2009. Sources: National Archive of
Criminal Justice Data. Online at https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD; U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011, Law Enforcement, Courts and Prisons.
Figure 2: Ratios of Females to Males
Notes: In this graph the relative participation rate, arrest rate and earnings of females are plotted with
respect to time. Each data point represents the ratio of female criminals to male criminals in a given year.
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Figure 3: Density of Illegal Earnings and Arrest for Males and Females
Notes: Here we plot the kernel density of log of illegal earnings and arrests for males and females. Figures on
the left of the panel include shoplifting while those on the right do not.
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Figure 4: Gender Participation Gap in Crime and Incentives
Notes: Here we plot the relationship between gender crime gap and average incentives across the two gender
(in log).
Y-axis: FemaleCrimes−MaleCrimes
FemaleCrimes+MaleCrimes
.
X-axis: MaleCrimes
FemaleCrimes+MaleCrimes
∗ log(Ill.EarningsofMales) + FemaleCrimes
FemaleCrimes+MaleCrimes
∗ log(Ill.EarningsofFemales).
Circles are proportional to the number of females who commit each crime. Figures on the left of the panel
include shoplifting while those on the right do not.
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Figure 5: Crime Gaps in the counterfactual scenario - Males Xs in the Female Equation
Notes: We plot the male, female and female counterfactual (with the male endowments) cumulative density
function of crime rates using estimates from the IV setup. The females counterfactual CDF reduces the gap
between the two CDFs.
Figure 6: Crime Gaps in the counterfactual scenario - Males βs in the Female Equation
Notes: We plot the male, female and female counterfactual scenario (with the male coefficients) cumulative
density function of crime rates using estimates from the IV setup. The females counterfactual CDF reduces
the gap between the two CDFs.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Synthetic Panel
Males Females
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of crimes 130,905 31.411 76.734 1 4862 116,369 12.141 19.590 1 437
Prob. of arrest 130,905 0.266 0.189 0.002 0.985 116,369 0.236 0.174 0.003 0.971
Illegal earnings 130,905 1345.738 2127.497 0.042 48000 116,369 1277.677 2437.313 0.050 55918
Population 130,905 10441.070 17091.890 11 250451 116,369 10583.730 16670.850 3 231350
Wage and salary income 130,905 21490.790 13417.040 940 83930.83 116,369 13878.190 7202.535 1392.857 54956.44
Employment rate 130,905 0.700 0.169 0 1 116,369 0.647 0.106 0.250 1
Age 15 - 24 130,905 0.393 0.488 0 1 116,369 0.382 0.486 0 1
Age 25 - 34 130,905 0.339 0.473 0 1 116,369 0.343 0.475 0 1
Black 130,905 0.276 0.447 0 1 116,369 0.273 0.445 0 1
Year 130,905 2005.446 4.018 1996 2011 116,369 2005.448 4.002 1996 2011
Embezzlement 130,905 0.057 0.232 0 1 116,369 0.064 0.245 0 1
Fraud 130,905 0.147 0.354 0 1 116,369 0.160 0.367 0 1
Counterfeiting 130,905 0.039 0.193 0 1 116,369 0.041 0.197 0 1
Bribery and Extortion 130,905 0.000 0.015 0 1 116,369 0.000 0.013 0 1
Pocket-picking 130,905 0.005 0.068 0 1 116,369 0.005 0.070 0 1
Purse-snatching 130,905 0.005 0.068 0 1 116,369 0.004 0.065 0 1
Theft from building 130,905 0.136 0.343 0 1 116,369 0.142 0.349 0 1
Theft from coin operated machine 130,905 0.001 0.030 0 1 116,369 0.001 0.024 0 1
Theft from a motor vehicle and its parts 130,905 0.067 0.249 0 1 116,369 0.064 0.245 0 1
Parts 130,905 0.015 0.121 0 1 116,369 0.012 0.111 0 1
All other larceny 130,905 0.237 0.425 0 1 116,369 0.248 0.432 0 1
Motor vehicle theft 130,905 0.097 0.296 0 1 116,369 0.093 0.290 0 1
Burglary 130,905 0.141 0.348 0 1 116,369 0.128 0.334 0 1
Robbery 130,905 0.043 0.203 0 1 116,369 0.034 0.180 0 1
Stolen property offenses 130,905 0.012 0.107 0 1 116,369 0.005 0.068 0 1
Notes: Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and year 1995 for the year dummies.
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Table 2: Differences in Illegal Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Illegal Earnings
Female -0.180*** -0.190*** -0.179*** -0.180*** -0.218*** -0.130***
(0.0331) (0.0235) (0.0103) (0.00964) (0.0112) (0.00861)
Black 0.125*** -0.0246 -0.0242 -0.0423** -0.0697*** 0.0685***
(0.0371) (0.0308) (0.0222) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0178)
Age 15 - 24 -0.0693 -0.109*** -0.188*** -0.182*** -0.195*** -0.129***
(0.0660) (0.0318) (0.0307) (0.0270) (0.0311) (0.0275)
Age 25 - 34 0.00384 -0.0143 -0.0158 -0.0123 -0.0200* 0.0268***
(0.0171) (0.0130) (0.0103) (0.00993) (0.0112) (0.00951)
Log Wage and salary income 0.416*** 0.283*** 0.197*** 0.190*** 0.172*** 0.189***
(0.0688) (0.0395) (0.0364) (0.0351) (0.0364) (0.0359)
Employment rate -0.968*** -0.528*** -0.392*** -0.346*** -0.255* -0.154
(0.257) (0.151) (0.126) (0.128) (0.135) (0.150)
Log Population 0.218*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.108***
(0.0126) (0.0174) (0.0117) (0.00889) (0.00977) (0.00807)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no yes yes yes yes
Offense FE no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no yes yes yes
Sample No shoplifting Daylight and no shoplifting All
Observations 247,274 247,274 247,274 247,274 182,708 283,750
R-squared 0.087 0.204 0.526 0.557 0.495 0.692
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of illegal earnings. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Estimates are weighted by
the size of the cohort.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Differences in Probability of Arrest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Probability of arrest
Female -0.204*** -0.268*** -0.0170 -0.0186 0.0215 0.0458***
(0.0636) (0.0578) (0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0143) (0.0101)
Black -0.166*** -0.0696** -0.00806 -0.0172 0.0274 -0.0521**
(0.0524) (0.0328) (0.0263) (0.0245) (0.0272) (0.0206)
Age 15 - 24 0.767*** 0.588*** 0.543*** 0.528*** 0.460*** 0.426***
(0.110) (0.0759) (0.0434) (0.0420) (0.0472) (0.0319)
Age 25 - 34 -0.00279 -0.0260 -0.0397* -0.0408** -0.0440** -0.0602***
(0.0342) (0.0229) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0219) (0.0191)
Log Wage and salary income 0.303** 0.175** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.133** 0.166***
(0.132) (0.0787) (0.0502) (0.0519) (0.0588) (0.0444)
Employment rate 0.109 0.180 0.480*** 0.425** 0.381* 0.224
(0.434) (0.219) (0.186) (0.183) (0.213) (0.166)
Log Population -0.0700*** -0.0281 -0.0351** -0.0317** -0.0202 -0.0156
(0.0207) (0.0181) (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0157) (0.0122)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no yes yes yes yes
Offense FE no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no yes yes yes
Sample No shoplifting Daylight and no shoplifting All
Observations 247,274 247,274 247,274 247,274 182,708 283,750
R-squared 0.147 0.308 0.537 0.578 0.555 0.685
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the log of the probability of arrest. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Estimates are
weighted by the size of the cohort. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: First Stage and Reduced Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
Panel A: First stage
Log Illegal Earnings
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.320*** 0.236*** 0.152*** 0.113*** 0.139*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.0740***
(0.0249) (0.0188) (0.00782) (0.00630) (0.00582) (0.00534) (0.00504) (0.00453)
Log Lag Prob. of arrest -0.0329*** -0.0457*** -0.0548*** -0.0397*** -0.0565*** -0.0375*** -0.0308*** -0.0221***
(0.0117) (0.0124) (0.00751) (0.00788) (0.00793) (0.00793) (0.00679) (0.00723)
Log Probability of arrest
Log Lag Prob. of arrest 0.509*** 0.463*** 0.362*** 0.305*** 0.368*** 0.311*** 0.323*** 0.268***
(0.00901) (0.01000) (0.00990) (0.00913) (0.0105) (0.00950) (0.00987) (0.00914)
Log Lag Illegal Earnings -0.00101 -0.00108 -0.00828*** -0.00239 -0.00895*** -0.00186 -0.00347* 0.000157
(0.00303) (0.00238) (0.00207) (0.00171) (0.00216) (0.00172) (0.00187) (0.00164)
First stage F-stat 80.78 77.24 192.8 164.9 298.5 200.8 203.2 133.9
Panel B: Reduced form
Log Crime rates
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.0259*** -0.0001 0.0560*** 0.0367*** 0.0530*** 0.0353*** 0.0383*** 0.0187***
(0.00676) (0.00555) (0.00323) (0.00278) (0.00324) (0.00280) (0.00248) (0.00215)
Log Lag Probability of arrest -0.0738*** -0.0495*** -0.0770*** -0.0785*** -0.0703*** -0.0697*** -0.0440*** -0.0467***
(0.0155) (0.0168) (0.00686) (0.00716) (0.00706) (0.00737) (0.00629) (0.00668)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no no no no yes yes
Test of equality between males and females (p-value)
Log Illegal earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Probability of arrest 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.381
Observations 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369
Notes: The dependent variable is on top of the estimates column. Control variables include race (black), age groups (age 15-24 and age 25-34 ), log wage and
salary income, and employment rate. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and year 1995 for the
year dummies. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. In the reduced form we test whether males and females have coefficients on the variables
of interest that are significantly different from zero. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Crime rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Earnings 0.0804*** -0.001 0.359*** 0.321*** 0.371*** 0.328*** 0.374*** 0.253***
(0.0218) (0.0235) (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0236) (0.0265) (0.0272) (0.0306)
Log Prob. of arrest -0.140*** -0.107*** -0.158*** -0.216*** -0.134*** -0.185*** -0.101*** -0.153***
(0.0302) (0.0363) (0.0188) (0.0227) (0.0191) (0.0233) (0.0191) (0.0243)
Black 1.411*** 0.875*** 1.287*** 1.059*** 1.218*** 1.023*** 1.201*** 0.985***
(0.0678) (0.0422) (0.0492) (0.0376) (0.0518) (0.0367) (0.0516) (0.0362)
Age 15 - 24 0.191 -0.230 1.028*** 1.078*** 1.019*** 1.131*** 1.002*** 1.101***
(0.138) (0.157) (0.0569) (0.0777) (0.0703) (0.0817) (0.0732) (0.0805)
Age 25 - 34 0.199*** 0.321*** 0.492*** 0.483*** 0.509*** 0.498*** 0.514*** 0.501***
(0.0389) (0.0231) (0.0183) (0.0148) (0.0183) (0.0153) (0.0187) (0.0153)
Log Wage and salary income -1.099*** -0.833*** 0.154** 0.722*** 0.197*** 0.812*** 0.190*** 0.783***
(0.157) (0.176) (0.0697) (0.108) (0.0646) (0.107) (0.0654) (0.106)
Employment rate 3.642*** 1.372*** -0.499 -1.901*** -0.816** -2.223*** -0.858** -2.152***
(0.579) (0.512) (0.347) (0.412) (0.340) (0.399) (0.342) (0.394)
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Test of equality between men and women (p-value):
Log Earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Prob. of arrest 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026
Observations 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369
R-squared 0.485 0.414 0.614 0.580 0.665 0.635 0.697 0.704
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of crime rate. We use four different specifications and we estimate them separately for males and for females.
Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and
year 1995 for the year dummies. We test whether males and females have coefficients on the variables of interest that are significantly different from zero.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Robustness: Other Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
Log Crime rates
WITH MISSING DATA
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.0751*** -0.0198 0.270*** 0.235*** 0.254*** 0.232*** 0.249*** 0.175***
(0.0245) (0.0288) (0.0294) (0.0305) (0.0281) (0.0290) (0.0264) (0.0277)
Log Lag Probability of arrest -0.172*** -0.121*** -0.244*** -0.309*** -0.216*** -0.268*** -0.157*** -0.206***
(0.0267) (0.0331) (0.0159) (0.0191) (0.0163) (0.0199) (0.0158) (0.0196)
WIGHTED BY POPULATION
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.153*** 0.194*** 0.376*** 0.424*** 0.326*** 0.370*** 0.332*** 0.336***
(0.0566) (0.0501) (0.0514) (0.0470) (0.0439) (0.0387) (0.0378) (0.0417)
Log Lag Probability of arrest -0.279*** -0.291*** -0.189*** -0.204*** -0.177*** -0.182*** -0.134*** -0.130***
(0.0623) (0.0835) (0.0311) (0.0407) (0.0305) (0.0391) (0.0325) (0.0372)
WITH SHOPLIFTING
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.0902*** 0.0189 0.362*** 0.349*** 0.370*** 0.357*** 0.381*** 0.299***
(0.0216) (0.0232) (0.0244) (0.0261) (0.0202) (0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0281)
Log Lag Probability of arrest -0.119*** -0.0777** -0.116*** -0.158*** -0.102*** -0.142*** -0.0693*** -0.108***
(0.0301) (0.0358) (0.0174) (0.0194) (0.0167) (0.0202) (0.0179) (0.0218)
Log Number of Crimes
WITH NUMBER OF CRIMES AS DEP. VARIABLE
Log Lag Illegal Earnings 0.278*** 0.297*** 0.405*** 0.400*** 0.427*** 0.419*** 0.454*** 0.390***
(0.0328) (0.0348) (0.0291) (0.0295) (0.0238) (0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0333)
Log Lag Probability of arrest -0.246*** -0.284*** -0.152*** -0.196*** -0.130*** -0.171*** -0.0983*** -0.139***
(0.0251) (0.0268) (0.0188) (0.0224) (0.0192) (0.0233) (0.0188) (0.0242)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE no no no no no no yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of crime rate. We use four different specifications and we estimate them separately for males and for females. Control
variables include race (black), age groups (age 15-24 and age 25-34 ), log wage and salary income, and employment rate. Excluded categories are: white for the
race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and year 1995 for the year dummies. Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Appendix Tables
The participation rate of females is difficult to reconcile to incarceration statistics. It is
well known that for every ten incarcerated males there is one female. We perform a meta
analysis on the way of females into the justice system in Table A.1. Each column “Females”
refers to the fraction of females that first committed the crime, then got arrested, served as
defendant and got incarcerated. We compare this fraction across each step of the judicial
process. We consistently observe that females fall out of the criminal justice system, as their
relative fractions decreases. Therefore, we find that the incarceration statistics are a biased
representation of the participation of females in crimes. With that in mind, our focus is going
to be on the decision to engage in crime and on how such decision depends on the probability
of arrest.
Table A.1: Reconciling Crime Reports and Arrest Figures
Crime Females Arrested Females Defendants Females Incarcerated Females
Larceny 55 % 38 % 61 % 44 % 36 % 31 % 20 % 17 %
Burglary 12 % 15 % 10 % 12 % 37 % 11 % 60 % 5 %
Motor Vehicle 3 % 20 % 3 % 17 % 11 % 16 % 7 % 6 %
Others 27 % 29 % 25 % 28 % 15 % 17 % 13 % 1 %
Notes: The second column shows what percentage of property crimes is classified according to the crime
categories in the first column. The third column shows what percentage of these crimes were committed by
females. The fourth column shows from all of the arrested how much were arrested for each crime category,
with respectively how much of these arrests were females. The sixth and seventh column show how much of
all incarcerated were put behind bars for each of the crime offenses and what percentage of that were females.
All statistics pertain to the year 2010, except for defendants - 2009. Source: NIBRS, 2010, Department of
Justice, 2012
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Table A.2: Unknown Offenders By Crime
UCR Crime Mean SD
231 Pocket-picking 0.11 0.02
232 Purse-snatching 0.08 0.02
233 Shoplifting 0.01 0.00
234 Theft From Building 0.12 0.03
235 Theft From Coin-Operated Machine 0.20 0.06
236 Theft from Motor Vehicle 0.17 0.04
237 Parts 0.21 0.06
238 All Other Larceny 0.13 0.03
240 Motor Vehicle Theft 0.14 0.04
220 Burglary 0.15 0.03
120 Robbery 0.04 0.01
280 Stolen Property Offenses 0.04 0.01
261 Swindle 0.07 0.02
262 Credit Card ATM Fraud 0.11 0.03
263 Impersonation 0.09 0.04
264 Welfare Fraud 0.03 0.02
265 Wire Fraud 0.16 0.04
250 Counterfeiting Forgery 0.07 0.02
270 Embezzlement 0.02 0.01
210 Extortion Blackmail 0.04 0.02
510 Bribery 0.03 0.02
Average 0.10
Notes: This table presents the fraction of offenders for whom the gender is not known. The Mean and
Standard Deviation are defined over the time series of the sample period 1995 - 2011.
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Table A.3: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Crime rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log Earnings 0.0498*** 0.0287*** 0.0851*** 0.0716*** 0.0830*** 0.0705*** 0.0686*** 0.0550***
(0.00694) (0.00566) (0.00350) (0.00289) (0.00335) (0.00289) (0.00260) (0.00219)
Log Prob. of arrest -0.0616*** -0.0188 -0.0618*** -0.0401*** -0.0468*** -0.0230*** -0.0234*** -0.00190
(0.0156) (0.0166) (0.00767) (0.00742) (0.00743) (0.00724) (0.00708) (0.00661)
Black 1.406*** 0.886*** 1.207*** 0.990*** 1.137*** 0.950*** 1.110*** 0.925***
(0.0672) (0.0419) (0.0482) (0.0344) (0.0502) (0.0333) (0.0498) (0.0325)
Age 15 - 24 0.151 -0.281* 0.912*** 0.985*** 0.906*** 1.034*** 0.895*** 1.021***
(0.141) (0.163) (0.0533) (0.0730) (0.0673) (0.0758) (0.0704) (0.0762)
Age 25 - 34 0.200*** 0.312*** 0.484*** 0.477*** 0.501*** 0.494*** 0.509*** 0.499***
(0.0393) (0.0238) (0.0170) (0.0140) (0.0171) (0.0143) (0.0178) (0.0146)
Log Wage and salary income -1.079*** -0.875*** 0.161** 0.709*** 0.201*** 0.786*** 0.201*** 0.762***
(0.160) (0.183) (0.0679) (0.103) (0.0629) (0.100) (0.0646) (0.102)
Employment rate 3.501*** 1.402*** -0.556 -1.894*** -0.844** -2.181*** -0.899*** -2.134***
(0.581) (0.527) (0.348) (0.396) (0.337) (0.378) (0.340) (0.381)
Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
County FE no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*County FE no no no no yes yes yes yes
State*Offense FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Test of equality between males and females (p-value):
Log Earnings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Prob. of arrest 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369 130,905 116,369
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of crime rate. We use four different specifications and we estimate them separately for males and for females.
Estimation includes fixed effects where noted with “yes”. Excluded categories are: white for the race, people in the age between 35 and 44 for the age group and
year 1995 for the year dummies. We test whether males and females have coefficients on the variables of interest that are significantly different from zero.
Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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